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NOTE
INMATE ACCESS TO ELECTIVE
ABORTION: SOCIAL POLICY,
MEDICINE AND THE LAW
Angela Thomast
"A society should be judged not by how it treats its outstanding
citizens but by how it treats its criminals." - Fyodor Dostoevsky
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973 the Supreme Court, in deciding the landmark case Roe v.
Wade, held that having access to abortion is a constitutionally pro-
tected right. ' Choosing to have an abortion prior to fetal viability is a
private decision between a woman and her physician that generally
should be free from government constraints.2 Any state regulation
that creates an "undue burden" on a woman seeking an abortion is
unconstitutional. 3  However, certain government entities have suc-
cessfully evaded the law and continue to systematically hinder and
even effectively prevent women from obtaining lawful abortions.
These government entities are jails and prisons,4 and the women are
inmates.
I Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. 2009; Wellesley
College, B.A. 2005. I would like to thank Dean Sharona Hoffman for her supervision
and assistance with writing this note. I would also like to thank my husband Jimmy
for his unwavering support.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
2 Id. at 164.
3 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
4 Jails and prisons differ in that jails are most often run by sheriffs and/or
local governments, and typically hold individuals awaiting trial or those serving short
sentences. Conversely, the Federal Bureau of Prisons and state governments run
prisons. For purposes of this note I will not distinguish between the two terms but use
them interchangeably. See Medscape.com, Incarceration Nation: Who Are the People
Behind Bars in the United States?, www.medscape.com/viewarticle/520251_2 (last
visited Jan 20, 2008) (defining the difference between jails and prisons before
discussing inmate demographics).
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Incarceration serves important purposes in society. 5 Although
incarceration by its nature entails limiting inmates' fundamental
rights, "no iron curtain [is] drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country."6 Abortion is a constitutional right that should
not be revoked or limited upon entering prison. It is especially impor-
tant to protect inmates' right to abortion as inmates tend to experience
higher risk pregnancies due to inadequate prenatal care, drug and
alcohol abuse, and mental illness.7 The Court has held that "[t]he
States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or
potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."
8
Correctional institutions, however, under the pretext of penological
interests, have implicitly intimidated women into carrying fetuses to
term by their prison abortion policies. This violates inmates'
constitutional rights.
In Part II of this Note I will explain fetal development, pregnancy
stages and abortion as a medical procedure. Part III will discuss abor-
tion rights' common law precedent, prisons' abortion policies, and the
current circuit split on the acceptable rules for inmate access to abor-
tion. Part III will also detail the two major arguments in the inmate
access to abortion debate: the Fourteenth Amendment reproductive
privacy argument and the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment argument. Part IV will explore the social policy argu-
ments behind altering prisons' abortion policies, and Part V will
suggest an improved abortion prison policy and explore the legal
strategies that could accomplish real change.
II. ABORTION AS A MEDICAL PROCEDURE
Understanding prenatal development and abortion as a medical
procedure is an important prelude to participating in the abortion
debate. Scientists have been able to identify the specific stages of
embryonic and fetal development during pregnancy. 9  Medical
5 The five major rationales for punishment are deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, retribution, and denunciation. See KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C.
MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 31 (2005).
6 Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
7 See Martin Donohoe, Incarceration Nation: Health and Welfare in the
Prison System in the United States, MEDSCAPE OB/GYN & WOMEN'S HEALTH, Jan. 20,
2006, available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/520251 ("Imprisoned wom-
en are a high-risk obstetric population.").
8 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 759 (1986) overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
9 See Fetal Development: What Happens During the First Trimester?,
[Vol. 19:539
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advances have resulted in fewer complications during surgical proce-
dures, including abortion.10 The medical community's understanding
of pregnancy has informed public policy and law regarding abortion.
Therefore, abortion and fetal development must first be explained
from a medical perspective in order to fully understand the social
policies behind abortion regulations.
The typical duration of pregnancy is thirty-eight weeks from
fertilization, or forty weeks from the date of the woman's last men-
struation." The medical community has divided pregnancy into three
broad stages, labeled trimesters.' 2 The first trimester is from the day
of the final menstruation to week twelve. 3 The second trimester is
week thirteen to twenty-seven, 14 and the third trimester lasts from the
twenty-eighth week to delivery, typically around week forty. 5
Within these trimesters, prenatal development is marked by four
significant transitions. 16  Two weeks after fertilization the
pre-embryonic cell mass develops into an embryo: one that is destined
to grow into a single baby, barring interference.17 Approximately four
to five weeks later the embryo is recognizable as a fetus and begins to
build up nerve cells and muscles allowing motility.' 8  At approxi-
mately twenty-four weeks into development, the fetus has produced a
basic neocortex, although many synapses are not yet linked.' 9 Also at
around twenty-four weeks the fetus is viable: its organs are developed
www.mayoclinic.com/health/prenatal-care/PROO12 (last visited Mar. 18. 2009) [here-
inafter First Trimester Fetal Development] (describing week by week development of
a fetus in the first trimester); Fetal Development: What Happens During the Second
Trimester?, http://mayoclinic.com/health/fetal-development/PROO113 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Second Trimester Fetal Development] (describing week
by week development of a fetus in the second trimester); Fetal Development: What
Happens During the Third Trimester?, http://mayoclinic.com/health/fetal-
development/PR001 14 (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Third Trimester Fetal
Development] (describing week by week development of fetus in the third trimester).
10 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, THE RIGHT To ABORTION:
A PSYCHIATRIC VIEW 33-34 (1970) ("While abortion at one time constituted a serious
surgical procedure, involving considerable morbidity and some death, modem surgi-
cal techniques together with antibiotics have minimized these risks.").
11 First Trimester Fetal Development, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Second Trimester Fetal Development, supra note 9.
15 Third Trimester Fetal Development, supra note 9.
16 Michael J. Flower, Coming into Being: The Prenatal Development of
Humans, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW 437, 445-46 (J. Douglas Butler &
David F. Walbert eds., 1992).





enough to survive outside the womb with medical intervention.2 °
Lastly, approximately between twenty-eight and thirty-two weeks,2'
the fetus's brain activity continues to increase, and the fetus enters
sleep and wake cycles similar to that of a newborn baby.22
Abortion is the removal or expulsion of the fetus and placenta
from the mother's uterus.23 Spontaneous abortion is not induced and
24is otherwise known as a miscarriage. A therapeutic abortion is a
procedure performed by a doctor when the pregnancy endangers the
woman's health, while elective abortions are executed because of the
mother's desire to terminate her pregnancy. 25 An abortion can be
performed one of two ways: surgically or by medication. 26 In a non-
surgical abortion doctors give the woman hormonal medication that
induces the uterus to expel the fetus as if the woman were having a
miscarriage.27 A woman can obtain a non-surgical abortion only up
until seven weeks after the first day of her last menstrual period.28
After seven weeks, surgical abortion is the sole option.29
In a surgical abortion, a doctor uses a vacuum device to remove
the fetus and placenta.3 ° If a surgical abortion is performed before
twelve weeks of pregnancy, the doctor will not usually dilate the
woman's cervix.31 Rather, the doctor may numb the cervix to limit
discomfort and give the woman a slight sedative. 32 If a surgical abor-
tion is performed after twelve weeks of pregnancy, the doctor must
first dilate the cervix and place small sticks-laminaria tents-into the
20 Second Trimester Fetal Development, supra note 9.
21 Flower, supra note 16, at 446.
22 Id.
23 AM. COLL. OF OBSTRETICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, INDUCED ABORTION
(2007) [hereinafter ACOG].
24 AM. COLL. OF OBSTRETICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, EARLY PREGNANCY
Loss: MISCARRIAGE AND MOLAR PREGNANCY (2007). For purposes of this note, I do
not intend to include "miscarriage" within the meaning of "abortion" unless otherwise
stated.
25 ACOG, supra note 23.
26 Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion
Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16, 16
(2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/fuil/3501603.pdf ("Thus,
for a woman who decides early in pregnancy that she wants an abortion, quality of
care may be enhanced if she can choose between a medical and a surgical
procedure ... ").
27 Id. at 20.
28 id.
29 id.
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cervix to cause it to open.33 In some instances this is done one or two
days before the doctor performs the actual abortion. 34 Once the cervix
is sufficiently dilated, the fetus and placenta are removed by
vacuum. 35 The doctor may place the woman under general anesthesia
during second trimester surgical abortions.36
The risks associated with abortion vary according to timing and
method. As a generality, "[a]bortions performed early in pregnancy
are associated with lower risks for mortality and morbidity. 37 The
later in a pregnancy the abortion is performed, the higher the risk of
complications. 38  During the first trimester, the most common side
effects of surgical abortion are "endometri[osis] (0.75%), excessive
bleeding and retained products of conception (0.61%)."'39 Other risks
include infection of the uterus or fallopian tubes, damage to the uterus
or cervix, and emotional or psychological distress.4 ° Second trimester
abortions carry a significantly higher risk of complications, especially
if performed after the sixteenth week. 41 Potential side effects of anes-
thesia include adverse reactions to the medication and breathing
irregularity.42
The risks of non-surgical abortion are "prolonged bleeding, the
fetus not passing completely from the body [necessitating] surgery,
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and pain. ,43 The occurrence of serious
side effects is low, however, with the most serious-the body failing
to expel the fetus, necessitating a surgical abortion-happening to





37 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Abortion Surveillance - United States, 2004, 56 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1,7 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5609.pdf.
38 See ACOG, supra note 23 (stating that the risk of damaging the uterus
"increases with the length of the pregnancy").
39 Kenneth R. Niswander & Manual Porto, Abortion Practices in the United
States: A Medical Viewpoint, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW 567, 580
(J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 3d ed. 1992) (citing David A. Grimes et
al., The Comparative Safety of Local vs. General Anesthesia for Suction Curettage
Abortion. An Analysis of 54,155 Cases, Presented at the 11 th Annual Meeting of the
Society for Epidemiologic Research, Iowa City, Iowa (June 14, 1978)).
40 ACOG, supra note 23.
41 Niswander & Porto, supra note 39, at 581.
42 ACOG, supra note 23.
43 Id.
44 Niswander & Porto, supra note 39, at 580.
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Abortions rarely cause death, and "the mortality from induced
abortion during the first 15 weeks of pregnancy is one-seventh the risk
of dying from pregnancy and childbirth. ' 45 Furthermore, there is no
concrete proof that a single abortion will negatively affect a woman's
future reproductive capabilities, although some controversial studies
claim that there is a higher risk of miscarriage for women who have
had two or more abortions.46
After an abortion a small amount of bleeding and cramping is
normal,47 and depending on the stage of the woman's pregnancy at
termination, a full physical recovery typically occurs within a few
days.48 Most women who have an abortion will recover without any
serious complications, as long as the abortion is performed at a suit-
able medical facility.49
III. ABORTION AND THE LAW
Courts have played an important role in shaping abortion rights in
the United States. The Supreme Court, in devising its opinion in Roe
v. Wade, examined abortion as a medical procedure. In deciding the
case, the Court balanced the medical nature of the procedure with
important social factors. The Court found two social factors particu-
larly essential to the issue: the pregnant woman's privacy rights and
the impact on society in general. 50 The Court examined the issue of
whether a fetus enjoys protection under the Constitution as an indi-
vidual, a question the Court perceived as different from the philoso-
phical and moral question of when life begins. 5' In answering this
question, the Court weighed the government's interest in protecting
fetal life against the woman's right to privacy.52
In Roe v. Wade the Court held that a Texas state law criminalizing
abortion was unconstitutional under the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Court further held that states cannot
restrict abortion access during the first trimester.54 The state can,
however, regulate abortion in the second trimester as it relates to
45 Id. at 581 (citing S. A. LeBolt et al., Mortality from Abortion and Child-
birth: Are the Populations Comparable?, 248 J.AMA 188 (1982)).
46 Id. at 581.
47 ACOG, supra note 23.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
"' Id. at 160-62.
52 Id. at 151-52.
" Id. at 164.
5 id
[Vol. 19:539
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maternal health, and prohibit abortion altogether in the third trimester
except for "preservation of the life or health of the mother.""5 Also,
the Court found that the correct standard to apply to state laws restrict-
ing abortion is strict scrutiny: the law must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.
56
In determining the framework for abortion regulation, the Court
decided that after the first trimester, the state had a compelling interest
in fetal life because at that point the fetus could potentially live
outside the womb, independent of the mother.57 Before fetal viability,
however, the state interest in fetal life is outweighed by the woman's
privacy concerns.58
Although the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the essential hold-
ing of Roe v. Wade, it has at the same time widened the scope of
permissible regulation and created an alternate constitutional test.59 In
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court upheld
several provisions of a Pennsylvania law that included consent re-
quirements, a 24-hour waiting period, parental consent for minors, and
reporting and recordkeeping requirements.6 ° In reaching its decision
the Court eliminated the trimester framework, focusing instead on
fetal viability. 6' The Court also replaced the prior strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review of state abortion regulations with an "undue burden"
test. 62 A restriction places an "undue burden" on a woman when the
law has "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 63
A. Prisons' Elective Abortion Policies and
the Current Circuit Split
Although many states have enacted abortion regulations similar to
Pennsylvania's, abortion is, generally speaking, freely available to
" Id. at 164-65.
56 Id. at 155-56.
" Id. at 163.
58 id.
59 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
60 Id. at 838-839. The sole provision the court invalidated was a spousal
consent requirement. Id. at 838.
61 Id. at 876.
62 Id. at 874 ("The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more diffi-
cult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.").
63 Id. at 877.
20091
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women in the United States.64 Female inmates, on the other hand,
automatically face obstacles when seeking an abortion that other
women do not. Inmates are incarcerated; they are behind bars, unable
to leave on their own volition for any reason. They are at the mercy
of the sheriffs, wardens and other prison personnel who determine
prison policy. 65 Abortions may not be performed in prisons, but must
be performed off-site by a third party. 66 Moreover, many prisons and
jails refuse to fund any aspect of an elective abortion-the procedure,
transportation or security-placing the financial onus on inmates who
are likely to be poor.67 Prison policies placing additional obstacles in
the way of inmates seeking elective abortions compound their already
substantial hardships.
One of the most common prison policies concerning inmate ac-
cess to elective abortion is the court order policy. 68 Under this rule,
an inmate who desires an elective abortion must file a motion with the
court requesting either supervised release 69 or temporary release on
her own recognizance 70 in order to obtain the abortion. Since most
court cases have dealt with this particular type of prison policy, this
will be the focus of my discussion.
State officials themselves have admitted to the restrictive nature
of these policies, and have even used them to effectively prevent
64 The number of abortion providers in the United States has declined since
1982. GUtrrMACHER INST., TRENDS IN ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973-2005
15 (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/presentations/trends.pdf. As of
2005, there were approximately 1,700 abortion providers operating in the United
States. Id. As of 2005, 87% of counties in the United States lacked an abortion pro-
vider. Access to Abortion Services, WHAT You NEED To KNoW (Ass'n Reprod.
Health Prof., Washington, D.C.), July 23, 2008, at 1. Despite the declining numbers,
women can still go to an abortion provider to receive an abortion.
65 Rachel Roth, Searching for the State: Who Governs Prisoners' Reproduc-
tive Rights?, 11 SOC. POL. 411, 413-14 (2004).
66 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (holding
that a state can prohibit public facilities or medical personnel from performing
elective abortions).67 Roth, supra note 65, at 423.
68 This assertion is based on the frequency of lawsuits challenging the court
order policy. Monmouth County Corr. Instinstitutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326 (3d Cir. 1987); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004), Doe v.
Barron, 92 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D. Ohio 1999). Since many prisons' abortion policies
are unwritten, determined on a "case by case" basis, or not released to the public, it is
difficult to determine with certainty the exact frequency of any given policy. See
Roth, supra note 65, at 422.
69 Under supervised release, a prison guard escorts and remains with the
inmate throughout the procedure and recovery. See, e.g., Doe v. Barron, 92 F. Supp.
2d 694, 697 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
70 See Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 334-35.
[Vol. 19:539
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inmates from obtaining an abortion while in jail. For example, one
staunchly pro-life sheriff in charge of operating a county jail admitted
that under the court order policy, "[t]he gal may have the baby by the
time it gets through the court system.', 71 In another instance, the Ohio
Supreme Court suspended a judge for six months who, in State v. Ka-
waguchi,72 gave a pregnant defendant an unusually harsh sentence
only after discovering that she intended to have an abortion.7 3 The
judge's sentence successfully prevented the inmate from receiving an
abortion, and she eventually gave birth.74
The Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of the
court order prison policy. Several appellate courts have heard the
issue, however, and there is currently a circuit split.75 The Third Cir-
cuit invalidated this particular policy in Monmouth County Corr. In-
stitutionaL Inmates v. Lanzaro.76 Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit later
held in Victoria W. v. Larpenter that such a policy is indeed constitu-
tional.77 In Roe v. Crawford, the Eighth Circuit recently decided a
case not involving a court order policy, but a blanket ban on transport-
ing inmates to clinics to receive elective abortions. 78 Although the
prison policy at issue in Roe did not involve a court order, the court
discussed the court order prison policy in dicta and referred to both
Victoria and Monmouth.79
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy and Due Process
In determining whether the court order policy violates the Four-
teenth Amendment, courts must first apply the Casey "undue burden"
test.80 A restriction places an "undue burden" on a woman when the
regulation has "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."'s If
the regulation fails the Casey test, and therefore violates the inmate's
constitutional right to an abortion, the court must apply the Turner v.
71 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Applauds Arizona
Court Decision Allowing Women in Prison to Obtain Abortion Care (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/abortion/28125prs20070123.html.
72 State v. Kawaguchi, 739 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
73 Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Cleary, 754 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (Ohio 2001).
14 Id. at 241.
75 See Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 351 (3d Cir. 1987); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004).
76 Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 351.
7 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 489.
78 Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 2008).
'9 1d. at 797-801.
80 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
1 Id. at 877.
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Safley standard of review for prison regulations to determine whether
the violation is permissible.82 The Turner Court held that prisons may
infringe upon inmates' constitutional rights as long as the restriction is
reasonably related to a legitimate prison interest.83 Not only does the
court order policy violate the Fourteenth Amendment under Casey,
but it improperly infringes upon inmates' constitutional rights under
Turner.
1. The Court Order Policy as an Undue Burden
States may not enact abortion legislation that has the effect or
purpose of "placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 84 A prison's court order
policy creates an administrative burden for inmates seeking elective
abortions. Once an inmate discovers she is pregnant-which in many
prisons may not be for several weeks after incarceration because most
prisons do not automatically administer pregnancy tests upon
entry 85-she must inform officials of her desire to terminate her preg-
nancy. This may not occur for several weeks since most prisons do
86not automatically administer pregnancy tests upon incarceration.
Oftentimes she is required to meet with a prison doctor or nurse,
which may not take place for several days.87 Then, the inmate must
contact her lawyer and ask him to file a motion to request a court
ordered release.88 Once the attorney actually files the motion and a
hearing is scheduled, additional time inevitably passes.89
Furthermore, depending on the judge's docket, even more time may
elapse before the judge is able to schedule the hearing.
In Monmouth, inmate Jane Doe was given a pregnancy test on
February 19, 1986, seven days after she entered Monmouth County
82 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
83 Id.
'4 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
85 Katherine Baldwin & Jacquelyn Jones, Health Issues Specific to Incarcer-
ated Women: Information for State Maternal and Child Health Programs, May 2000,
http://www.jhsph.edu/wchpc/publications/prison.pdf ("[L]ess than half of correctional
systems routinely screen incoming female inmates for pregnancy.").
Katherine Baldwin & Jacquelyn Jones, Health Issues Specific to Incarcerated Wom-
en: Information for State Maternal and Child Health Programs, May 2000,
http://www.jhsph.edu/wchpc/publications/prison.pdf ("[L]ess than half of correctional
systems routinely screen incoming female inmates for pregnancy.").
86 See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 2004).
87 id.
88 Id.
89 Logically, it seems unlikely that an attorney would be able to draft and file
a motion for temporary release the same day she learns of her client's request.
[Vol. 19:539
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Correctional Institution (MCCI).90 The pregnancy test showed that
Jane Doe was pregnant.9' Upon indicating to MCCI staff on or about
March 3, 1986 that she desired an abortion, she was informed that
MCCI would only provide inmates with an abortion in emergency
life-threatening situations.92 Otherwise, Jane Doe would have to first
apply for a court order before MCCI would provide her with abortion
access.93 Inmates at MCCI had previously instituted a class action
against MCCI administrators and other county officials, and on April
4, 1986, on behalf of Jane Doe and other class members, the inmates
sought temporary and preliminary injunctive relief.94 In particular, the
inmates requested that the county provide Jane Doe, who at the time
was already nine weeks pregnant, with access to abortion services.95
While the preliminary injunction was pending, Doe was released from
prison to obtain an abortion.9 6 Doe received an abortion more than a
month after she first alerted prison officials of her desire to terminate
her pregnancy.
97
Under Casey, states may not create abortion regulations that have
the effect or purpose of "placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 98 In Monmouth,
Jane Doe was forced to wait for almost a month while prison staff
ignored her request for an abortion, effectively preventing her from
obtaining the elective abortion she desired in a timely manner. There-
fore, a month long administrative delay clearly constitutes an "undue
burden" under Casey.
Similarly, in Victoria W. v. Larpenter,99 the prison's court order
policy placed an "undue burden" on an inmate seeking an elective
abortion. On July 28, 1999, upon entering the Terrebonne Parish
Criminal Justice Complex, Victoria underwent a physical examina-
tion. 00 The exam results indicated that she was pregnant.' 10 Victoria
immediately informed the medical personnel of her desire to terminate
90 Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,






96 Id. at 329.
97 Id.
98 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
99 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004).
'o Id. at 478.
101 Id.
20091
the pregnancy. 0 2 Medical personnel told her at that time to ask for a
meeting with the head nurse, and Victoria requested the meeting.' °3
During the interim, prison officials transported Victoria to a local
medical center several times and paid for her prenatal care.1°4 On
August 6, an ultrasound confirmed that Victoria was fifteen weeks
and two days into her pregnancy.105 On August 12, the head nurse
and the prison's medical administrator met with Victoria and told her
that she would need to get a court order before the prison would allow
her to obtain an abortion. 0 6 At this meeting Victoria called her law-
yer and instructed him to file for the court order.1
0 7
Although Victoria's lawyer created further delays by waiting sev-
eral weeks to file for the court order,' 08 the prison, in creating an
almost two week delay, already placed an "undue burden" on Victo-
ria. Courts have held that "delays of a week or more do indeed
increase the risk of abortion to a statistically significant degree."'
0 9
The prison court order policy creates inevitable delays of at least a
week, and as Victoria and Monmouth show, often longer. Delays that
increase the risks associated with abortion to a statistically significant
degree create an undue burden under Casey. Consequently, a prison
court order policy places an undue burden on inmates seeking an
abortion in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to repro-
ductive privacy under Casey.
2. Applying the Turner Standard
Incarceration, however, by its very nature, requires violation of
certain fundamental rights. In Turner v. Safely, the Supreme Court
held that jails may enact policies that infringe on prisoners' constitu-
tional rights when the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate





106 Id. at 479.
107 Id.
10 Id. at 479.-80.
109 Doe v. Barron, 92 F. Supp. 2d 694, 697 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (quoting
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985). Abortions become signifi-
cantly riskier after week 16, and generally the later the abortion is performed the
higher the risk to the health of the mother. ACOG, supra note 23. The difference a
week can make in a pregnancy, and therefore an abortion, is also illustrated by the
constant developments a fetus undergoes during pregnancy. See, e.g., First Trimester
Fetal Development, supra note 9.
110 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
550 HEAL TH AMTRIX [Vol. 19:539
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Turner are: 1) whether the prison regulation has a "valid, rational
connection" to the legitimate government interest, 2) whether "other
avenues" remain open for inmates to exercise the right, 3) the impact
on prison personnel and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources of implementing the claimed constitutional right, and 4)
whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation."' This rational
basis test requires only a low level of judicial scrutiny and is largely
deferential to prison policy. Despite the lower level of judicial
scrutiny, courts can-and should-find regulations unconstitutional
under the rational basis standard of review. 
112
The success or failure of a Turner argument depends on the
sequence of events and corresponding prison policies. For example, if
a jail singles out elective abortions for treatment that is different from
the way other elective medical procedures are handled, then it is more
likely that a court would find that the policy fails the reasonably re-
lated test.' '3 If the prison uniformly applies regulations governing
elective medical procedures, the court may be more likely to find that
the policy passes muster under the Turner test.' 14 Also, the prison's
stated interests-i.e., security, cost, or liability-will affect the out-
come of the court's decision." 5
The first factor of the Turner test is whether the prison policy has
a reasonable relationship to legitimate penological interests. If the
prison's interest in requiring a court order is to avoid "unspecifed, yet
insurmountable, administrative and financial burdens," the court will
likely find that this interest is not sufficiently related to the regulation,
as the court did in Monmouth. 16 The Monmouth court found that
restricting Constitutional rights based on the lone interest of limiting
prison costs would counter prior precedent and violate the spirit of the
Constitution." 7  Courts are hesitant to consider prison costs as a
determinative factor in deciding cases involving constitutional chal-
lenges to prison regulations because prisons could use the cost argu-
... Id. at 89-90.
112 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (holding under rational
basis review that a Colorado law denying equal protection to homosexuals was
unconstitutional).
113 See Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 798, 798 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
prison's blanket ban on providing elective abortions contrasted to the prison's alter-
nate policy regarding other elective procedures was unconstitutional).
114 See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 488 (5"' Cir. 2004).
115 See id.
116 Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
329, 336 (3d Cir. 1987).
". Id. at 336 n.17 (finding that upholding the cost argument "impugns the
sanctity of the Constitution and fmds no support in the case law").
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ment to justify denying inmates such basic provisions as food, medi-
cal care and humane living conditions."
18
The defendants in Victoria were more successful at showing a
reasonable relationship, however, because they stated different
penological interests. The Victoria court held that the state's interests
in limiting their security and liability risks by requiring court orders
for elective medical procedures were legitimate." 9  Although the
Victoria court also held that the court order policy had a rational rela-
tionship to security and liability interests, 120 this opinion may have
ignored certain facts. Given that prisons normally transport inmates
outside of the prison for prenatal care and birth, the frequency and
duration of which is greater than that of a single elective abortion,
court order prison policy for elective abortions does not actually
further the state's interest in limiting security and liability risks.'
2
'
The second Turner factor is "whether there are alternative means
of exercising the right that remain open to the prison inmates.' 22
Clearly, there is no other way for inmates to exercise the right to
obtain an elective abortion except by adhering to the prison's abortion
policy. The Victoria court concluded, however, that the second
Turner factor is not singularly dispositive. Rather, the court found
that the regulation's overall reasonableness was the most important
consideration.
23
Conversely, the Monmouth court found that while prison officials
are not required to implement the best way of accommodating consti-
tutional rights, "the opportunity they provide inmates to exercise the
asserted right must be meaningful. 124 The court further held that the
prison's court order policy "effectively deprives maximum security
inmates who seek [elective] abortions of any opportunity to exercise
their option of choosing to abort their pregnancies.' 25 The court also
118 Id. at 336 (quoting Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("state's interest in limiting the cost of detention... will justify neither the
complete denial of ... [food, living space, and medical care] nor the provision of
those necessities below some minimally adequate level"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096
(1986)).
"9 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 486-87.
120 Id. at 487.
... Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 795 (8th Cir. 2008); Monmouth County
Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 338 (3d Cir. 1987). See infra
notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
122 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
123 Victoria, 369 F.3d at 487.
124 Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
337 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 226 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986)).
125 Id. at 337.
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found that the possibility that minimum security offenders could be
effectively denied a "reasonable opportunity safely to terminate their
pregnancies" is more important than the state's concerns with cost and
administrative efficiency. 126
The Monmouth court found that the prison's arguments as to the
third factor-the effect that accommodating the prisoner's constitu-
tional right would have on guards, other inmates and the allocation of
prison resources-were without merit. 127 The impact on the greater
inmate population from allowing prisoners to obtain elective abortions
without a court order would be minimal, if not nonexistent. 121 Since
the prison has an obligation to pay for necessary medical care, includ-
ing all prenatal care, the prison would actually expend fewer resources
on providing elective abortions than it would if the inmate chose to
carry the fetus to term.
129
The Victoria court disagreed, however, and held that paying for
guards to escort Victoria to an abortion provider an hour away and
remain with her for three days during recovery is a sufficient burden
on prison resources. 130 The court further decided that limiting poten-
tial liability by avoiding unnecessary prison transports was reason-
able.' 3' The question, however, is not whether a policy is reasonable
based on minimizing prison costs, but whether the asserted right "will
have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff..
S., Allowing inmates to obtain an elective abortion without a court
order would not detrimentally affect other inmates or prison staff.
Prisons must pay for all necessary medical care, including prenatal
care and childbirth. 133 Many prisons refuse to pay for transportation
to an abortion clinic or for the abortion itself. 34 Even if prisons were
to pay for abortion services, a single abortion costs less than nine
months of prenatal care and delivery. On average, the cost of a surgi-
cal abortion performed at a nonhospital facility is $523 at 10 weeks
gestation and $1,339 at 20 weeks gestation. 135 The average cost of an
126 Id. at 337-38.
127 See id. at 340-44.
128 Id. at 341-42.
129 See id.
130 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir. 2004).
131 Id.
132 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
133 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 478.
134 Federal funds may not be used to pay for abortions. See GUTrMACER
INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID
(2009), available at http://guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib SFAM.pdf. Also,
states are permitted to refuse to expend funds on abortions. Id.
135 Access to Abortion Services, WHAT You NEED To KNOW (Ass'n Reprod.
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early medical abortion performed before the seventh week of gesta-
tion is $490. 36 Conversely, an uncomplicated pregnancy's average
cost for prenatal care and hospital delivery is $7,600.137 As a group,
inmates suffer from higher instances of substance abuse; 38 therefore,
the chances of inmates suffering from complications during pregnancy
are also higher. 139 Higher risk pregnancies can translate to increased
costs.
Furthermore, the cost of paying prison guards to escort the inmate
to the abortion clinic would be lower for one, or at most two 14° visits,
versus several prenatal doctor appointments plus a hospital stay for
childbirth. The security interest argument can be discarded by the
same logic. Allowing an inmate to leave prison for one abortion
procedure creates less of a security risk than for multiple prenatal
doctor visits plus a hospital stay. Therefore, if prisons were to provide
elective abortions upon request, the new policy would not signifi-
cantly affect the allocation of prison resources, other prisoners or
prison staff. On the contrary, the prison would probably expend fewer
resources.
The fourth Turner factor is the presence of a ready alternative to
current prison policy.' 41 Despite not employing a "least restrictive
alternative" test, 142 "easy alternatives may be evidence that the regula-
tion is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison con-
cers."'143 Again, the Monmouth and Victoria courts came to different
conclusions on this factor. The Monmouth court found that providing
abortion services to inmates would not disrupt the prison's valid inter-
ests given that the prison is required to provide all pregnancy related
services to inmates.144
Health Prof., Washington, D.C.), July 23, 2008, at 1.
136 Id.
137 STEVEN R. MACHLUN & FREDERICK ROHDE, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES FOR UNCOMPLICATED
PREGNANCIES, MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, RESEARCH FINDINGS #27 2
(2007), http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data-files/publications/rf27/rf27.pdf.
138 See infra, notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
139 See Barbara Morse, et al., Screening for Substance Abuse During
Pregnancy: Improving Care, Improving Health, National Center for Education in
Maternal and Child Health 1, 3 (1997).
140 See ACOG, supra note 23 (explaining that sometimes doctor recommend a
follow up visit after the abortion is performed to ensure that all products of concep-
tion have been passed through the body).
141 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
142 Id. A "least restrictive alternative" test would require prisons to adopt the
policy that infringes the least upon the prisoners' constitutional rights.
143 Id.
144 Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
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The Victoria court, however, found that prisons are not bound by
a "least restrictive means" standard, meaning that prisons are not
required to formulate policies that limit inmates' constitutional rights
as little as possible. Despite the fact that prisons are not required to
implement the least constitutionally-restrictive policies they can
devise, 145 an overly limiting policy is unacceptable. The policy fails
to satisfy the fourth Turner factor because there is an easy alternative
to the court order policy: prisons could choose to classify elective
abortions in the same way as prenatal care or childbirth.
Considering all four prongs of the Turner test together, prisons'
court order policies should be invalidated because they are not
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Although some
courts have upheld prison abortion policies under the Turner test,
146
the Fourteenth Amendment due process argument may prove more
successful than the alternative Eighth Amendment claim. Neverthe-
less, when opposing court order abortion policies, both constitutional
arguments are valid and should be presented to courts for
consideration.
C. The Eighth Amendment Prohibition on
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment was originally intended to prevent torture
and other barbaric punishments. 147 Over time, the Supreme Court has
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits more than conventionally
barbarous punishment. 48  The Eighth Amendment forbids punish-
ments that are contrary to "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society . . . or which "involve the un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain.' 50 Therefore, according to
the Court in Estelle v. Gamble the Eighth Amendment has created an




344 (3d Cir. 1987).
145 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 487 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987)).
146 See Monmouth, 834 F.2d 326; Doe v. Barron, 92 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.
Ohio 1999).
147 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S 97, 102 (1976) (citing Anthony F. Granucci,
"Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: " The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L.
REv. 839, 842 (1969)).
148 Id. at 102; see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
149 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
150 Gregg, 428 U.S at 173 (citations omitted).
151 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
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1. The Deliberate Indifference Standard
In order to succeed on an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment claim, an inmate must meet both prongs of the test articu-
lated in Estelle v. Gamble: 1) the inmate experienced an objectively
serious medical need and 2) the prison officials actually knew about
the serious medical need and were deliberately indifferent to it.5 2 To
prove deliberate indifference one must show that a state official acted
knowingly, not merely negligently. 53 In Bryant v. Maffuci, prison
officials failed to schedule an abortion for an inmate until she was too
far along in her pregnancy to have an abortion. 54 In spite of the
inmate's persistent requests to obtain an abortion since her first day in
prison and despite the fact that medical staff had been tracking the
duration of her pregnancy and had marked her file as an "emergency,"
the court held that prison officials merely acted negligently in failing
to schedule a timely abortion. 55 Therefore, the officials did not act
with deliberate indifference. 1
56
The mental element of "deliberate indifference" can also be diffi-
cult to prove where several state actors are involved. In Gibson v.
Matthews, prison officials had scheduled an abortion for Gibson, a
pregnant inmate. 157 After traveling for several days, through multiple
federal prison facilities, Gibson arrived at a federal prison in West
Virginia only to discover that abortions were not performed there.' 58
By the time she reached an appropriate facility, doctors informed her
that she was too far along in her pregnancy to have an abortion. 59
The court held that since no particular official was responsible for
Gibson not receiving the abortion and because the officials paid
prompt and serious attention to the inmate's needs as soon as each of
them became aware of Gibson's desire for an abortion, there was no
deliberate indifference, "at most, the actions ... amounted to negli-
,,160gence ....
Although the state actors in Bryant seemingly worked hard to
facilitate the inmate's abortion request,16 1 under the Bryant and
Gibson holdings, almost any imaginable state action effectively pre-
152 id.
153 Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1991).
114 Id. at 980-81.
"' Id. at 986.
156 Id.




161 Bryant, 923 F.2d at 982-83.
[Vol. 19:539
INMATE ACCESS TO ELECTIVE ABORTION
venting or unnecessarily delaying an inmate from obtaining an abor-
tion would qualify as mere negligence. Because the risk of complica-
tions from abortion increases as the pregnancy progresses, 162 once
prison officials are aware of an inmate's desire to terminate her preg-
nancy, they should act with all deliberate speed to facilitate the proce-
dure. Slow communication between prison officials and outside clin-
ics should not serve as an excuse for nonperformance. Some courts
have found that when prison officials refuse to provide transportation
to an inmate seeking an abortion, or otherwise delay or deny her
request absent a court order, their actions automatically constitute
deliberate indifference. 163 Given that state actors could easily dodge
liability in cases of real deliberate indifference by arguing that they
were merely negligent, all courts should adopt this stricter definition
of deliberate indifference.
2. Serious Medical Need
Elective abortions constitute a serious medical need not only for
women in general, but inmates in particular. The defendants in
Monmouth attempted to argue, in regards to their duty to provide
medical care, that an elective abortion is essentially similar to a "face-
lift or the removal of varicose veins for purely cosmetic reasons...
.9'64 Making the decision to terminate a pregnancy bears no resem-
blance whatsoever to undergoing elective cosmetic surgery. Although
elective abortion is not necessary in a strict sense-by its definition
elective abortion is not performed to preserve the physical health or
life of the woman-it can be necessary to the women who choose it.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "serious" as "dangerous; [or]
potentially resulting in death or other severe consequences.' 65
Elective abortion constitutes a serious medical need for inmates in
particular 166 because of the horrendous treatment inmates suffer
162 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
163 See Doe v. Barron, 92 F. Supp.2d 694, 694 (S.D. Ohio 1999), Roe v.
Crawford, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (W.D. Mo. 2005). "Where prison authorities deny
reasonable requests for medical treatment, however, and such denial exposes the
inmate 'to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,' . . . deliberate
indifference is manifest." Monmouth County Corr. Instutional Inmates v. Lanzaro,
834 F.2d, 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th
Cir. 1976) (cited with approval in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 n.11 (1976))).
16 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 345 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
165 BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY 1398 (8th ed. 2004).
166 I am not suggesting that elective abortion is a serious medical need and
therefore all pregnant inmates should terminate their pregnancies; rather, I'm arguing
that for inmates who choose to have an abortion, the abortion is a serious medical
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during childbirth, the statistically higher chance that pregnant inmates
have not received adequate prenatal care, and the increased probabil-
ity that pregnant inmates suffer from substance abuse or mental health
problems. 1
67
Furthermore, the experiences of women giving birth while in cus-
tody support the conclusion that elective abortion is a serious medical
need. Pregnant inmates are regularly shackled and handcuffed until
moments before childbirth. 168 Women are reportedly restrained even
when they have no history of violence or escape attempts.169 One
pregnant inmate of Cook County jail in Illinois recounted her horrify-
ing experience of giving birth while in custody:
I was taken into the labour room and my leg was shackled to
the hospital bed. The officer was stationed just outside the
door. I was in labour for almost twelve hours. I asked the
officer to disconnect the leg iron from the bed when I needed
to use the bathroom, but the officer made me use the bedpan
instead. I was not permitted to move around to help the
labour along.... The doctor came and said that.., this baby
is coming right now, and started to prepare the bed for deliv-
ery. Because I was shackled to the bed, they couldn't remove
the lower part of the bed for the delivery, and they couldn't
put my feet in the stirrups. My feet were still shackled to-
gether, and I couldn't get my legs apart. The doctor called for
the officer, but the officer had gone down the hall. No one
else could unlock the shackles, and my baby was coming but I
couldn't open my legs. Finally the officer came and unlocked
the shackles from my ankles. My baby was born then. I
stayed in the delivery room with my baby for a little while,
but then the officer put the leg shackles and handcuffs back
on me and I was taken out of the delivery room. 70
Sadly, this woman's experience seems to be typical. Several other
women have reported that they were handcuffed during labor and
need.
167 See infra, notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
168 AMNESTY INT'L, RIGHTS FOR ALL: "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE":
VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY (1991),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/001/1999 (follow "HTML" hyper-
link).
169 Id.
170 This inmate was in jail for a drug conviction, and only had one prior shop-
lifting conviction on her record. She was not violent, and not classified as dangerous.
She had never attempted to escape. Id. at 32.
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even while giving birth. 171 Another recounts the shame she felt in the
hospital when she was forced to wear shackles when she went to the
nursery, a public area in the hospital, to see her baby. 72 Yet another
woman was continually shackled to the hospital bed after delivering
via caesarian section despite the doctor's request that she be permitted
to walk around to aid in her recovery. 173 These are just a few exam-
ples of how difficult and terrible childbirth can be for women in
custody.
Furthermore, restraining prisoners during labor, delivery and
recovery is a hazard to the health of the mother and the baby.
Dr. Patricia Garcia, an obstetrician and gynecologist at North Western
University's Prentice Women's Hospital, attests that:
Women in labour need to be mobile so that they can assume
various positions as needed and so they can quickly be moved
to an operating room. Having the woman in shackles
compromises the ability to manipulate her legs into the proper
position for necessary treatment. The mother and baby's
health could be compromised if there were complications
during delivery, such as haemorrhage or decrease in fetal
heart tones. If there were a need for a C-section (caesarian
delivery), the mother needs to be moved to an operating room
immediately and a delay of even five minutes could result in
permanent brain damage for the baby. The use of restraints
creates a hazardous situation for the mother and the baby,
compromises the mother's ability post-partum to care for her
baby and keeps her from being able to breast-feed.
74
Medical opinion evidences the unacceptable and even dangerous
treatment of inmates during childbirth and recovery.
If women are effectively prevented from obtaining an abortion
due to delays caused by the court order policy, they may be forced to
experience these same horrible conditions. Doctors have concluded
that restraining women who are about to give birth can endanger the
health and safety of the woman and the child. 7s Furthermore,
although prisons should strive to improve their treatment of inmates
during childbirth and recovery, allowing prisons to institute abortion








ment is unacceptable. Since these conditions still exist today, in order
to avoid potentially causing the inmate serious harm, inmate access to
elective abortion should be recognized as a serious medical need.
Various courts have found that elective abortion constitutes a
serious medical need. 176 The Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade indi-
rectly supports the contention that elective abortion is a serious medi-
cal need for the women who chose it. The Court found that:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional off-
spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care
for it.
177
The Court found that denying a woman abortion access implicitly
leads to severe consequences. Since "potentially resulting in . . .
severe consequences' 178 is included in the definition of "serious",
courts should find that elective abortion constitutes a serious medical
need.
The Monmouth court reasoned that pregnancy automatically
presents a woman with two alternatives: "childbirth or abortion.' 7
Both options are acceptable under the law,' 80 and both require differ-
ent medical treatment. Therefore, choosing to abort a fetus versus
carrying the fetus to term should not result in a different legal charac-
terization. 18 Prenatal care and childbirth are considered serious med-
ical needs. Abortion is simply an alternate course of action a woman
may pursue during pregnancy; therefore, both reproductive options
should be treated the same way and both should be characterized as a
serious medical need.
176 See, e.g., Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987).
177 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
178 BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 1398 (8th ed. 2004).
179 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 348.
180 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
181 Id.
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IV. SOCIAL POLICY
Behind each abortion regulation and court ruling are various
social policy concerns. The state must precariously balance the value
of fetal life against the privacy rights of the woman.
Abortion necessarily involves the interests of four distinct entities:
the unborn fetus, the mother, the family the fetus will be born into if
carried to term, and society at large.1 82 People may choose to give
greater weight to one group's interest versus another. Each interest's
relative importance determines a person's views on abortion.
Those who believe that true human life begins at conception place
a high value on the life of the unborn fetus. If the unborn fetus is a
person, then abortion equates to murder. Giving great weight to the
fetus' interests, however, does not preclude divergent viewpoints.
Another perspective focuses on the potential future life of the baby
once it is born: if the fetus would be born with defects that would ren-
der it incapable of living a normal life or if it would otherwise be born
into a deleterious family environment then, according to this view-
point, it would be acceptable to terminate the pregnancy.
18 3
Typically, those who place the highest value on the rights of the
expectant mother favor reproductive choice: a mother's personal au-
tonomy trumps other interests. The Supreme Court examined wom-
en's privacy interests in its constitutional analysis of abortion, and
concluded that the expectant mother's interests trump the other rele-
vant interests most of the time.
184
Focusing on the interests of the family can result in views either
favoring or disfavoring abortion. Those who wish to uphold the tradi-
tional family unit may oppose abortion. For example, certain relig-
ions preach that intercourse is strictly a means to procreate; therefore,
any conceived child, despite being unwanted, is still an integral part of
a family. 185 Conversely, some people believe that if the family is un-
able to properly care for a child and would be overly strained by preg-
nancy and childrearing, then abortion may be an acceptable
option.
182 B. J. George Jr., State Legislatures Versus the Supreme Court: Abortion
Legislation into the 1990s, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 3, 4 (J. Douglas
Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 1992).
183 Id. at 5.
184 See also Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do
not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a
woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature.").
185 See George, supra note 182, at 6.
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Almost any of the above arguments can be couched in terms of
societal good or detriment, e.g., protecting the life of the unborn,
granting women the power to control their bodies and family out-
comes, maintaining the traditional family unit, etc. 186 Another impor-
tant aspect of community interest, however, concerns "the freedom of
the medical profession to approach termination of pregnancies on the
same basis as other medical problems, free from arbitrary controls."'' 87
As a society we want physicians to give the best care possible to their
patients without facing unnecessary obstacles.
The most compelling social policy arguments in the inmate access
to elective abortion debate concern the interests and welfare of the
pregnant inmate. Over the past fifteen years, the number of incarcer-
ated women has increased by 92%. 188 Due to the United States' "war
on drugs," drug related offenses caused almost 40% of this in-
crease. 189 Also, "the number of women receiving sentences of more
than one year has increased by 80% since 1990.' ' 190 More women are
in prison today than ever before and serving longer sentences.
In 2005, there were 107,518 female prisoners in state or federal
correctional institutions. 191 Given the upward trend of incarceration,
this number is probably slightly higher today. As of 2004, 60.2% of
female inmates in state prisons and 42.8% of female inmates in fed-
eral prisons met the criteria for drug abuse or dependence. 192 Of both
male and female federal inmates, 78.7% reported using drugs at least
once, with 64.3% admitting to using drugs regularly.' 93 The figures
for drug use are slightly higher among state prisoners. 194 There is also
a high instance of mental health issues among female prisoners. Of
female inmates, 73.1% in state prison, 61.2% in federal prisons and
75.4% in local jails suffered from mental health problems. 95 Finally,
186 Id. at 7.
.87 Id. at 8.
188 Baldwin & Jones, supra note 85, at 1.
189 id.
190 Id.
191 PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2005 4 (Nov. 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf1p05.pdf.
192 CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL
PRISONERS, 2004 7 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf.
'9' Id. at 2.
194 Id.
195 DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 4 (Sep.
2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
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approximately 6% of female inmates are pregnant during incarcera-
tion. 196
Pregnancy is unique.1 97 Deciding whether to abort a fetus or carry
a pregnancy to term has significant financial, medical, emotional,
psychological and social consequences. 98 Reproductive decisions not
only affect a woman in the present, but will affect her life in ongoing
and innumerable ways. 199 Deciding whether to carry a fetus to term
not only impacts the pregnant woman, but the unborn fetus as well.2 °°
If the mother abuses illicit substances or alcohol while pregnant or
does not seek proper prenatal care, the fetus has a higher probability
of being born with severe disabilities.20' This not only reduces the
baby's quality of life, but places extra strain on the caregivers.
Doctors have found that abortion can be a particularly appropriate
choice for inmates who suffer from drug addiction and mental insta-
bility.2 °2 Given that female inmates are more likely to abuse drugs
and alcohol, suffer from mental conditions, and have access to less
203wealth and resources, prisons should not adopt abortion policies
that could effectively prevent inmates from obtaining an abortion. If
the choice to terminate a pregnancy is given to all women, it should be
most stringently protected for this specific group.
196 Baldwin & Jones, supra note 85, at 5.
197 Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
348 (3d Cir. 1987) ("There is no other medical condition known to this Court that
involves at the threshold an election of options that thereafter determines the nature of
the necessary medical care. In other words, the condition of pregnancy, unlike can-
cer, a broken arm or a dental cavity, will require very separate and distinct medical
treatment depending upon the option--childbirth or abortion-that the woman elects
to pursue.").
198 Nancy Felipe Russo, Psychological Aspects of Unwanted Pregnancy and
Its Resolution, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 593, 593 (J. Douglas Butler &
David F. Walbert eds., 1992).
199 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 10, at 19
("Mothering is a task that requires enormous human and emotional resources....
[W]hen the child is unwanted, the task may become onerous, and the obligations
created may become a lifetime sentence, an ordeal emotionally destructive to the
mother and disastrous for the child.").
200 Id.; See also Russo, supra note 198 at 595 ("Unwanted children are more
likely to have chaotic and insecure family lives, perform more poorly in school,
exhibit delinquent behavior and require treatment for symptoms of psychological
distress and psychopathology.").
201 Morse, supra note 139, at 3.
202 Doctors who examined inmate Doe found that terminating the pregnancy
was particularly appropriate because Doe was a "chronic drug abuser" and "not
emotionally equipped to carry a child to term .. " Monmouth County Corr. Institu-
tional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 1987).
203 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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Lastly, reproductive rights are human rights. Article 12 of the
United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") mandates:
1) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against women in the field of health care
in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women,
access to health care services, including those related to fam-
ily planning.
2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this arti-
cle, States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services
in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal
period, granting free services where necessary, as well as
adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.
204
CEDAW establishes reproductive choice as a human right.205 Out of
the 185 Parties to have signed the treaty, the United States is the sole
country to have signed the treaty, but not ratified it. Therefore, the
United States is not bound to uphold its provisions. Being the pariah,
the United States should seek to align itself with what over 90 percent
of the member countries in the United Nations believe is in line with
modem standards of decency concerning reproductive rights. In order
to remain in accordance with international standards of human rights,
prisons should voluntarily abolish the court order policy in favor of
policies protecting free reproductive choice. Courts should also look
to international standards when deciding cases involving inmate
access to elective abortion.20 6
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR AFFECTING CHANGE IN
PRISON POLICY
The widely accepted court order prison policy impermissibly
violates inmates' Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. There-
fore, political activists and lawyers should try to persuade jails and
204 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 12, Dec. 18, 1979 (opened for signature), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article 12.
205 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women introduction, Dec. 18, 1979 (opened for signature), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, avail-
able at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#intro ("The
convention also affirms women's right to reproductive choice.").
206 For an example of the U.S. Supreme Court examining international stan-
dards in deciding a constitutional question, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) where the court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments preclude
juvenile capital punishment.
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prisons to embrace policies that provide inmates with pregnancy tests
upon incarceration, counseling in the event of a pregnancy, and an
elective abortion if requested. If prisons are unwilling to alter their
current policies, then civil rights lawyers should represent inmates
seeking elective abortions and challenge unconstitutional prison
policies.
Currently, only 47 percent of prisoners routinely receive medical
207exams upon incarceration. Along with a routine medical examina-
tion, prisons and jails should screen female inmates for pregnancy
upon incarceration. This would allow the inmate to seek the proper
care as soon as possible, whether pre-natal care or an abortion. Early
pregnancy notification would shorten delays for women seeking abor-
tions. Prisons should also provide counseling services for pregnant
inmates. Many suffer from problems such as drug dependence, men-
tal illness, and lack of education, which makes them particularly ill-
equipped to face difficult pregnancy decisions alone.20 8
The sooner an abortion is performed, the lower the risk of harm to
the woman.20 9 The time between the inmate requesting an abortion
and prison officials making an appointment with an abortion provider
should be no longer than a week.210 In order to minimize unnecessary
delays, prisons should arrange for inmates to receive an abortion
without a court order. As part of providing the inmate with proper
medical care, prison officials should schedule the abortion at an
appropriate medical facility and provide transportation for the proce-
dure. Also, as abortion is a serious medical need, the prison should
pay for the prisoner's transportation and abortion procedure rather
than compel the inmate to pay for it herself.
21
'
States would argue that the cost of providing pregnancy tests,
counseling, the abortion procedure and transportation to the abortion
provider would create too much of a burden. Compared to what the
state would pay for pre-natal care and childbirth services, however,
the state may spend less money on inmates who opt to terminate their
pregnancies than on those who carry the fetus to term. Nine months
of medical care and childbirth costs the state more money than one
207 Baldwin & Jones, supra note 85, at 4.
208 See supra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
210 Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[D]elays of a
week or more do indeed increase the risk of abortion to a statistically significant
degree.") (citation omitted).
211 The international standard dictates that prisons should pay for inmates'
necessary medical care. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 168.
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abortion.212 Even though there are significantly fewer abortion pro-
viders than there are obstetricians,21 3 which translates into a higher
probability of traveling longer distances to obtain an abortion versus
pre-natal care, the cost to the state would probably still be less.
Furthermore, as long as the prison acts quickly to facilitate the
inmate's receiving an abortion, the costs associated with the abortion
will most likely be low. If the rate of complications and length of
recovery increases the longer the woman waits to have an abortion,
the state has an interest and responsibility in ensuring that the inmate
seeking an abortion receives one quickly in order to minimize poten-
tial costs. The state should not be able to promulgate a policy that
creates delays for the inmate, and then argue that the costs of an abor-
tion are too high. In order to further the state's interest in reducing
cost, the prison should provide the inmate with the opportunity to
obtain an abortion as soon as she expresses a wish for one.
Concerning prisons that refuse to alter their unconstitutional court
order prison policies, activists should turn to the courts for redress. In
the Third Circuit, plaintiffs challenging the court order policy would
undoubtedly succeed because lower courts are bound by precedent to
follow the Monmouth court's ruling. In the Fifth Circuit, which
upheld the elective abortion prison court order policy as constitution-
ally sound,214 challenging prison policy on similar factual grounds
may fail. Initiating lawsuits that are factually distinguished from
Victoria may prove successful, however. The Victoria majority spe-
cifically highlighted the factual differences between its case and
Monmouth.215 The ideal plaintiff in a case challenging a prison's
court order policy in the Fifth Circuit would be one whose attorney
did not delay in filing for a court order. In Victoria, the inmate's
lawyer further delayed her from obtaining a court order by failing to
file a request for temporary release in a timely manner, thereby creat-
ing a causation issue.216 Also, a model plaintiff would have followed
the steps required by prison officials and would have either been ef-
fectively denied an abortion because the policy's inherent delays
pushed her past fetal viability, or suffered from complications from
the abortion procedure.
Since the Eighth Circuit has not actually decided a case involving
the court order policy, it is difficult to say with certainty whether chal-
lenging the policy in the Eighth Circuit may prove successful. The
212 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
213 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
214 Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475,487 (5th Cir. 2004).
215 Id. at 487-88.
216 Id. at 479-80.
[Vol. 19:539
INMATE ACCESS TO ELECTIVE ABORTION
court in Roe v. Crawford cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in Victoria.217 Given the Eighth Circuit's leanings toward
finding the court order policy constitutional, it may be wise to avoid
challenging the policy in the courts of this circuit. No ruling is prefer-
able to an unfavorable one that creates a negative precedent. In any
case, it would be unwise to appeal cases regarding prisoner access to
abortion to the Supreme Court given the Court's recent trend of
restricting abortion rights.218 Waiting until the Court's composition
changes may be strategically wise.
Ideally, all courts hearing this issue would find the prison court
order policy unconstitutional. However, if challenging prison abor-
tion policies fails in the courts, another strategy could be encouraging
reproductive rights organizations to increase involvement in aiding
prisoners in obtaining court orders. Attorneys in these organizations
could help inmates apply for court orders, thereby expediting the
process. Also, disseminating a publication that explains the necessary
steps inmates must take in order to secure an abortion in prison would
be helpful.219 Organizations could make the publication available
over the internet. Also, the publications could be sent to prisons and
jails across the country and added to the prisons' law libraries.
If an attorney representing a woman seeking an abortion is
responsible for creating an unacceptable delay in filing the motion, or
if he chooses to file a different motion without discussing it with his
client first, he should be reported to the ethics board and reprimanded.
Attorneys have a duty to zealously represent their clients' interests.22 °
The Victoria court found that the plaintiff's attorney created the delay
that resulted in Victoria's being unable to obtain an abortion while in
prison.221 Generally, given the time sensitive nature of abortions, it is
important to facilitate the process so that inmates can obtain the
desired abortion in a timely manner. The very last person who should
stand in the inmates' way of having a lawful abortion is her lawyer.
Finally, disseminating information to the public at large on the
inhumane conditions pregnant prisoners suffer during childbirth and
217 Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 797 (8th Cir. 2008).
218 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding in a 5-4 decision
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, which restricts the intact dilation and extraction
abortion method, even in cases where the health of the mother is in jeopardy).
219 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, YOUR RIGHT TO PREGNANCY-RELATED
HEALTH CARE IN PRISON OR JAIL, http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/
reprorightsad20060816.pdf. The ACLU currently posts a document on their website
explainig the reproductive rights of women in prison.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
221 Victoria W., 369 F.3d at 490.
2009]
HEALTH MA TRIX
the lack of adequate medical care in general may increase interest in
this issue. Currently, the opaque nature of unwritten prison policies
frustrates accountability. If the public became more aware that preg-
nant inmates' constitutional rights are being unacceptably violated,
perhaps there would be more support for policy change. Raising pub-
lic awareness was a successful tactic for opponents of lethal injection.
A Google news archives search of "lethal injection" limited to the
year 2003 resulted in 2,390 hits. This number dramatically increased
for 2004 (2,930), 2005 (3,820), 2006 (5,110) and 2007 (9,690). In
2008, the Supreme Court decided a case challenging the constitution-
ality of lethal injection.222 Public opinion is a strong force in the po-
litical process, so disseminating information could affect positive
change in prisons' abortion regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Convicted criminals are perhaps the most disfavored group in
society. No one race, gender, religion, nationality or creed is so
universally despised. Reproductive rights scholar Rachel Roth stated
that "[i]f political science tends to ignore prisons, research on prisons
tends to ignore women., 223 I would take her assertion one step further
and argue that if research on prisons tends to ignore women, inmates'
reproductive rights are steadfastly overlooked. The disfavored status
of female inmates coupled with the controversial nature of abortion
results in general apathy toward the plight of pregnant inmates.
Many prisons have instituted the "court order policy," which
forces a pregnant inmate desiring an abortion to first obtain a court
order of release. Although at first glance these policies seem accept-
able-inmates are convicted criminals and must remain incarcer-
ated-in actuality they can create dangerous delays that result in
higher risk abortions. These policies have also effectively prevented
inmates from obtaining elective abortions because by the time the
inmate is able to secure a court order, she is past the point of fetal
viability.
As a society, we have a duty to defend the Constitutional rights of
all of our citizens, not only the ones we favor. Performing this duty is
the mark of a civilized society. In the case of incarcerated individuals,
society must infringe upon their Constitutional rights due to the nature
of their punishment, but the infringements should not occur recklessly
or carelessly. Prisons should create their restrictions with great cau-
222 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
223 Roth, supra note 65 at 415.
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tion. The Supreme Court has ruled that "no iron curtain [is] drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country. ' ,224 Serving
prisons' interests such as safety, cost, and security, while protecting
inmates' Constitutional rights is a delicate balance to strike.
Currently, court order policies do not strike the appropriate balance.
Rather than instituting an arbitrary policy that does nothing but
create unnecessary burdens on inmates seeking abortions, prisons
could still serve penological interests by qualifying elective abortion
as a serious medical need. Instead of forcing the inmate to go through
the rigmarole of obtaining a court order of release, the prison could
easily provide the inmate with an abortion, the same as if it were to
provide prenatal care to the inmate had she chosen to carry the fetus to
term. In order to uphold the integrity of our Constitution, prisons
should abolish the court order policy and replace it with a policy
protecting inmates' free reproductive choice.
224 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
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